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1 Introduction
Economists have long been concerned with the influence of firm size on economic perfor-
mance (Schumpeter 1911) and, as a consequence, with its determinants (Lucas 1978). A
robust empirical finding is that average firm size varies substantially even across countries
at a similar stage of development. Table 1, taken from Bartelsman, Scarpetta & Schivardi
(2003), reports average firm size for a set of OECD countries for broad sectoral subdivi-
sions. In manufacturing, the average number of employees ranges from 80.3 in the US, to
39 in Germany and 32 in France, reaching a minimum of 15.3 in Italy. These variations
are confirmed by more sectorally disaggregated studies (Kumar, Rajan & Zingales 2001).
In particular, cross-country diﬀerences are not simply driven by the sectoral composition of
the economy: rather, countries with a large overall size tend to show the same pattern even
within narrowly defined sectors (Davis & Henrekson 1999, Pagano & Schivardi 2003). This
suggests that firm size distribution might have an important country specific component.
Notwithstanding the relevance of these cross-countries diﬀerences, very little is known
about their causes. Cross-sectional studies relating size distribution to country characteris-
tics are plagued by collinearity, measurement and omitted variable problems, making this
line of investigation problematic.1 This paper takes a diﬀerent route. First, we consider
one particular institutional feature, i.e., employment protection legislation (EPL). While
the theoretical literature does not establish any uncontroversial link between EPL per se
and average firm size,2 one particular feature of EPL may impede firm growth: in many
countries, EPL provisions are more stringent above certain employee thresholds. For exam-
1Kumar et al. (2001) undertake such an experiment for a set of European countries, confirming the
diﬃculties in pinning down the country-level determinants of firm size.
2Bentolila & Bertola (1990) show that firing costs reduce employment turnover, but have only second
order eﬀects (and, in their simulations, mostly positive) on average employment.
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ple, in Germany and Austria establishments with less than 6 employees are exempted from
EPL, while in France firms with less then 10; in Spain, 40% of the severance payment due
upon dismissal (20 days wages for each year of seniority, up to a maximum of one year) is
covered by a state fund for firms with less than 25 employees; in Italy EPL is substantially
less stringent for firms with less than 16 employees. The presence of such thresholds can
clearly influence the size distribution, because firms might be discouraged to grow above
them to avoid the more stringent EPL.
Second, we conduct a within-country analysis based on Italy, a country that presents
a natural laboratory for testing the eﬀects of EPL on size. Italy is characterized both by
a more stringent regulation for firms above the 15-employee threshold and by one of the
largest share of small firms in industrialized economies. Indeed, in policy debates EPL is
often indicated as one of the most important factors in explaining the left skewed distribution
of Italian firms.
Our aim is to quantify the eﬀects of the threshold on steady state size distribution. To
this end, we construct a simple model that, given the indivisibility of labor and Gibrat’s
law, predicts a smoothly increasing relation between a firm’s probability of growing (as
well as shrinking) and its size, and show that the threshold eﬀect implies a drop in the
probability of growing in the proximity of the threshold itself. While highly stylized, the
model singles out the assumptions required for identification and oﬀers a number of further
testable predictions. In this exercise, we take the behavior of firms above the threshold as
fixed, so that our exercise only identifies the threshold eﬀect.3
Based on these predictions, we use a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of all Italian
3As noted above, the literature on firing costs does not indicate any clear-cut relationship between EPL
and average firm size, suggesting that the eﬀects above the threshold might be second order ones. The
policy debate also reproduces this insight: the size eﬀects of EPL are invariably related to a supposedly low
propensity of small firms to grow.
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firms between 1986 and 1998 to estimate the eﬀects of EPL in discouraging small firms from
growing. Finally, to measure the impact of the threshold eﬀect on firm size in the long run,
we compute the actual stochastic transition matrix for firm size and use our estimates to
remove the threshold eﬀects. Using the properties of Markov chains, the modified matrix
can then be used to determine the steady-state firm size distribution that would emerge in
the absence of the threshold.
To measure the eﬀects of the threshold on growth propensity, we run a probit of positive
employment changes on a polynomial in size and additional controls. The model fits the
data remarkably well, except in the proximity of the threshold, where it overpredicts growth
by approximately two percentage points, that, according to our identification procedure, is
the measure of the impact eﬀect of the threshold. We therefore conclude that, as theory
predicts, the threshold eﬀect does influence firm size. Once we compute its eﬀect in steady
state, it proves to be very modest: we estimate that, after removing the threshold, average
size would increase by 0.5 per cent, a value that would narrowly reduce the gap in size
of Italian firms versus those of other industrial countries (see Table 1). Extensions of this
exercise along several dimensions show that the increase in average firm size would remain
below 2% even under the less conservative hypotheses.
Our analysis adds to within country empirical research on the eﬀects of employment
protection legislation. Autor (2003) and Autor, Donohue & Schwab (2004b) exploit cross-
state variation in the adoption of common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
in the US, to estimate its role in explaining the spread of the temporary help supply industry
(the first), and its impact on employment (the second). Acemoglu & Angrist (2001) show
that the detrimental eﬀects the Americans with Disabilities Act on the employment of
disabled people are diﬀerentiated according to firm size, because its provisions do not apply
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to small firms. This suggests that the Act might have introduced a bias in the American
size distribution similar to the one we find for Italy.4
Our results contrast previous work on Italian data that has been unable to find any
eﬀect of the threshold on the size distribution (Anastasia 1999). This is probably because
of the relative small eﬀect, which can only be detected with a very rich dataset like the one
we use. A recent exception is Borgarello, Garibaldi & Pacelli (2002), that, in independently
developed work, also finds significant but quantitatively small eﬀects of EPL on firms’
propensity to grow. Our approach diﬀers both in the modeling and the estimation strategy;
moreover, we use a more comprehensive dataset; finally, we compute the long-run eﬀects
on the steady state distribution of firms. As to other countries, Verick (2004) exploits a
legislative change in Germany to measure the threshold eﬀect of EPL, finding mixed and
inclusive evidence on its relevance. Boeri & Jimeno (2003) consider the implications of the
EPL threshold for dismissal probabilities in Italy and Spain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief summary of
the EPL in Italy; Section 3 constructs a simple model of firm growth that illustrates our
identifying assumptions and empirical predictions, while Section 4 estimates the threshold
eﬀects. Section 5 constructs the stochastic transition matrix and simulates the eﬀects of
EPL in the long run, and Section 6 concludes.
4Until 1999, Italian legislation had similar provisions that only applied to firms with more than 35
employees. Indeed, we have found that this threshold reduces the probability of growth of firms with 35
employees of about 2 percentage points, an eﬀect very similar to that estimated for the 15 employee threshold.
Again, the long run eﬀects on firm size distribution are rather limited.
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2 Institutional setting
In economies where ”employment at will” does not apply,5 firing costs can be thought of
as the result of three main elements: the definition of fair and unfair dismissal; the cost of
a no-fault dismissal and the penalty when the dismissal is ruled to be unfair; the odds for
the result of a possible trial. The first defines when firing is allowed; the second assesses
the costs a firm can incur; the third describes the actual enforcement of the law and the
probability of winning a case for unfair dismissal.6
According to Italian employment protection legislation, individual and collective dis-
missals of workers with open-end contracts are only allowed on a just cause basis. Workers
can be fired because of misbehavior (giusta causa o giustificato motivo soggettivo), or the
firm’s need to downsize or reorganize its activities (giustificato motivo oggettivo). A worker
cannot be fired to be replaced with another if this is not justified by worker misconduct or
by the need to restructure the activity. For instance, it would not be possible to fire an
employee with a long tenure and a high salary just to replace her with a young worker paid
the minimum contractual wage.
Workers can appeal to the court against dismissal. If the judge rules the dismissal
was unfair, workers are entitled to compensation that varies according to firm size.7 Since
1990, these general rules apply on an almost universal basis, irrespective of the employers’
5Strictly speaking, even in the US, whose legislation is considered one of the least stringent among
the industrialized countries, employment at will does not apply anymore, as several exceptions have been
introduced by the courts (Autor, Donohue & Schwab 2004a).
6This representation clearly indicates that comparing the institutional settings across countries is a very
diﬃcult task. Indeed, a close look at the most commonly used international measure of EPL, the OECD
index (OECD 1999), shows that, at least in the Italian case, the measure has several problems. In particular,
the TFR, a form of deferred compensation to which the worker is entitled upon separation independently of
its nature (fired, quit or retired), is erroneously computed as a firing cost. We discuss these issues more in
detail in the appendix.
7Discriminatory dismissals, such as for ethnic, religious or trade-union membership reasons are never
allowed; in this case a worker always has the right to be reinstated in the work place irrespective of the
firm’s size.
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characteristics.8 Firing costs are nil when a dismissal is not contested or it is ruled to be
fair, although firms may want to pay workers to make firing easier (this is especially true
in collective dismissals, when lump-sum payments are sometimes explicitly bargained with
trade unions). In cases of unfair dismissals, the workers’ compensation varies substantially
according to the firm’s size. Firms with less than 16 employees must compensate unfairly
dismissed workers with a severance payment that varies between 2.5 and 6 months of salary
(tutela obbligatoria). As an alternative to the severance payment, firms with less than 16
employees can opt for reinstating the worker. The potential cost of an unfair dismissal is
substantially higher in larger firms. Firms with more than 15 employees,9 to which Article
18 of the “Statuto dei lavoratori”10 applies, have to compensate workers for the forgone
wages in the time elapsing between the dismissal and the sentence, with no upper limits.
As the trial can last up to five years, the firm that loses a case for unfair dismissal will
have to pay the worker a large sum of money. Moreover, firms are obliged to reinstate the
unfairly dismissed worker, unless he or she opts for a further severance payment equal to
15 months of salary.
Given that the definition of fair dismissal is not particularly restrictive (OECD 1999)
and that the cost is nil if a dismissal is ruled to be fair, a critical variable in determining
the expected firing costs in Italy is uncertainty about the result of the trial. The actual
application of a rule is always diﬃcult to assess, as it depends critically on the courts
8 In 1991 a special procedure was introduced for collective dismissals in firms with more than 15 workers.
When a firm with more than 15 employees wants to fire five or more workers within 120 days to reorganize
or to downsize its production, it has to follow a procedure that involves the trade union representatives
and the public administration. Firms and unions are asked to reach an agreement on dismissals; if the
administration finds that an agreement is not possible, the firm can still dismiss the workers. When choosing
which workers to fire, firms are required to take into account specific criteria, such as seniority and workers’
family conditions, usually explicitly stated in collective contracts.
9More precisely, the rule refers to establishments with more than 15 employees, firms with more than 15
workers in the same municipality or with more than 60 employees in all establishments combined.
10Law 300 of 1970, “Statuto dei lavoratori,” was passed after the so-called “hot autumn” of 1969, when
large-scale strikes were called all over the country, forcing the Parliament and the government to pass pro-
labor reforms.
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and on the judges’ interpretation of the law. Some Italian jurists deem the discretionary
power of judges to be far reaching (Ichino 1996), so that firms undergoing a trial for unfair
dismissal would not be sure of the result even when the dismissal is justified by the firm’s
needs or the worker’s behavior. In fact, the firm bears the burden of proof. The judges’
discretionary power is limited when the dismissal is due to the need to reduce employment
or reorganize the production process. On the contrary, when the dismissal is due to worker
misconduct, the judge is asked to assess the eﬀective behavior of the worker. In this case
it could prove diﬃcult for a firm to show a worker deserves to be fired. For large Italian
firms, this uncertainty can be extremely important, as the compensation in cases of unfair
dismissal depend on the duration of the trial, which can be very long. Ichino (1996) argues
that the uncertainty about the result of the case, together with the potential high cost in
case of loss, is a strong deterrent to initiating a dismissal procedure even when the firm
might think it has the right to do so. Thus, the expected firing cost should be substantially
higher for firms with more than 15 workers, to which Article 18 of the Statuto dei lavoratori
applies.11
3 A simple model of threshold eﬀects and size structure
In this section we construct a model of size evolution in the presence of the threshold eﬀect
induced by EPL. In the tradition of modern theories of firm size distribution, we assume
that firms are heterogeneous in productivity, which determines optimal individual firm size
11The threshold of 15 workers is also relevant for the establishment of the “Rappresentanze Sindacali
Aziendali”. Workers of firms with more than 15 employees can elect trade union representatives at firm
level, who can call general meetings, aﬃx posters on union activities and call referendums. This represents
a further eﬀect of the 15-employee threshold, whose relevance, however, is likely to be minor, as trade union
membership and activity within the firm do not depend on the presence of a “Rappresentanza Sindacale
Aziendale”. Moreover, collective agreements also apply to workers and firms that do not belong to unions
and employers’ organizations.
7
(see for example Lucas (1978), Hopenhayn (1992) and Jovanovic (1982)). The model has
two main ingredients. First, we assume that labor is indivisible. Second, firms above a
certain threshold face a higher costs of labor. This assumption formalizes the notion that
EPL applies diﬀerentially to firms of diﬀerent sizes. It clearly represents a shortcut with
respect to modeling firing restrictions directly; however, as shown by Bentolila & Bertola
(1990), firing costs can be thought of as increasing the expected cost of labor, because the
firm takes into account the expected costs of firing. This assumption greatly simplifies the
analysis while resulting in several general empirical predictions derived from the fact that
the expected cost of labor is higher above a certain threshold. This is therefore a simple
and convenient way of modeling the behavior of firms below the threshold. As we will see,
the assumption is more problematic for firms above it.
Firms produce output with a decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas technology with
labor as the only input, with a productivity or demand shock A that determines the marginal
product of labor:
Y = Alα (1)
For given wage w, optimal employment is:
l∗ = (αA
w
)
1
1−α (2)
In this economy, the size structure at any point in time is determined by the distribution
of A, and its evolution by the stochastic evolution of A. We assume that A = eε and that
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ε evolves according to a random walk:
εt = εt−1 + ut (3)
where u is and iid normal random variable distributed according to a N(0,σ2). This
formulation can accommodate two features that have appealing implications for firm-size
dynamics:
1. Firm productivity is highly persistent;
2. Percentage changes in productivity are independent of the productivity level itself:
∆ logA = ut.
The first feature reproduces the empirical regularity that firm size is a regular process
rather than an erratic one; the second, known in the literature as Gibrat’s law of independent
increments, implies that absolute changes in employment depend on size.
Consider now labor adjustment. From (2), and assuming that the wage is fixed, labor
adjustment will be:
∆ log l = 11− α∆ logA
This equation assumes that labor is perfectly divisible. Given that the relevant entity for
EPL legislation is the number of employees, and given that this is exactly what we observe
in our data, we want to characterize employment behavior when l ∈ N+, the nonnegative
integers. Define l =int((αAw )
1
1−α ) as the optimal integer employment given A. Given
indivisibility, employment cannot change continuously with A, so that the employment-
productivity relation can be represented with a step function. Consider first the case in
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which A = l1−αwα , l ∈ N+, i.e., the value of productivity is such that an integer employment
value would be exactly optimal even without indivisibility. To determine if the firm increases
employment after an increase in productivity to A0, we simply need to check if profits at
l + 1 are larger than at l, given the new productivity level: in fact, if the new maximum
prescribes l0 > l, then the profits are increasing in l as log as l < l0, so that profits at l + 1
are larger than at l. Therefore, the condition is:
increase l if A0(l + 1)α −w(l + 1) > A0lα −wl
or
A0 >
w
(l + 1)α − lα
The probability of increasing employment conditional on A = l1−αwα is then:
Pr{l0 > l|A} = Pr{A0 > w
(l + 1)α − lα |A} = Pr{u
0 > ln(
α
l(( l+1l )
α − 1)
)} (4)
where we use the fact that A0 = Aeu
0
and A = l1−αwα ,. The right hand side of the inequality
is decreasing in l ; moreover, it is a smooth function of l. These two properties imply that
the probability of increasing employment is a smoothly increasing function of employment
itself: in fact, it reaches a minimum of Pr{u0 > ln α2α−1} for l = 1, where ln α2α−1 is strictly
larger than zero, and converges to Pr{u0 > 0} = 12 for l →∞. A similar argument applies to
the probability of decreasing employment, which is also an increasing and smooth function
of initial employment. As we will see, this property, which derives from indivisible labor
and Gibrat’s law, is very much in line with the empirical evidence. Note also that the
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probability of adjusting employment is independent of the wage, which influences the level
of employment but not its changes.
We have derived the result under the assumption that A = l1−αwα for l integer. In
general, firms with employment level l will have productivity levels A in range around
l1−αwα , i.e. the range for which l is preferable to both l − 1 and l + 1. Call this set
Al. To determine the probability of increasing employment conditional on l, one needs to
integrate over this set: Pr{l0 > l|l} = RAl Pr{l0 > l|A}dG(A), where G(A) is the CDF of
the productivity level over Al. As shown by the literature on Ss policy rules (Caplin &
Spulber 1987), the behavior of the “representative firm” considered above is suﬃcient to
characterize to a first degree approximation the average probability of adjustment, because
the higher probability of increasing employment of firms in the upper part of Al will be
compensated by the lower ones of those in the lower range of Al.
We now turn to the threshold eﬀect. We assume that firms above the relevant em-
ployment threshold l˜ pay a wage wH = λw, with λ > 1.12 We temporarily put aside the
integer problem, which, for this part of the argument, is inconsequential and would only
make notation substantially more involved.
If we define Π(A) as the maximized value of profits for a firm with productivity level
A, we find:
Π(A) = (1− αα )(
αA
wα
)
1
1−α . (5)
Clearly, Π0(A) > 0: the higher the productivity level, the higher the profits. The problem
of the firm in the presence of a threshold above which the EPL imposes additional costs
12Another possibility is to assume that firms that pass the threshold pay an additional fixed cost c. This
assumption is less realistic and, in any case, leads to very similar predictions.
11
can be formulated as follows:
max
l
{Alα − [wI{l≤l˜} + λw(1− I{l≤l˜})]l} (6)
where I{l≤l˜} is the indicator function taking the value of 1 if l ≤ l˜ and zero otherwise. Define
A˜ = wl˜
1−α
α as the minimum productivity level at which optimal employment is l˜. Clearly,
optimal employment will be equal to (αAw )
1
1−α for A ≤ A˜. Moreover, if A > A˜ and the firm
optimally chooses not to pass the threshold, the employment level which maximizes profits
is l˜ , because profits are increasing in l for l < l˜. For A > A˜, we therefore need to compare
profits at l˜ with those at the optimized value of employment given wH = λw
Al˜α −wl˜ ≶ (1− αα )(
αA
(λw)α )
1
1−α . (7)
By construction, evaluated at A˜, the left-hand side of (7) is larger than the right-hand side;
moreover, the former increases linearly with A, while the latter exponentially. This implies
that there exist one and only one A¯ at which (7) is satisfied as an equality, and above which
it is optimal to pass the employment threshold. It is easy to show that the size of the
productivity range in which l˜ is the preferred employment level increases with λ. We can
therefore characterize optimal employment as follows:
l∗ =



(αAw )
1
1−α
l˜
(αAλw )
1
1−α
if A < A˜
if A˜ ≤ A < A¯
if A ≥ A¯
The same conditions hold for the indivisible labor case. The diﬀerence is that the profits
in (5) will not generally be attainable, so that profits will be lower than in the unconstrained
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case. This implies that A¯ must be adjusted to compensate for this, so that the minimum
value of A that prescribes adjustment will generally be larger. However, the reduction in
profits because of indivisibility is rather modest, so that this constitutes a second order
eﬀect with respect to the impact of the increase in labor costs.13
Define A˜+1 as the minimum value of A which, in the absence of EPL, would induce a
firm which experiences a productivity gain from A˜ to A˜+1 to increase employment from l˜
to l˜+ 1. If the costs of EPL are nontrivial, then A˜+1 < A¯, the more so the larger λ. Then,
we have that:
Pr{l0 > l˜|A˜} = Pr{A0 ≥ A¯|A˜} < Pr{A0 ≥ A˜+1|A˜} (8)
if and only if A¯ > A˜+1, where we use the notation Pr{A0|z} ≡ Pr{A|At = z} The inequality
in (8) formalizes the notion that EPL makes employment growth less attractive for firms
within the proximity of the threshold. This implies that, with respect to a situation without
the diﬀerential eﬀect of the EPL, we should observe:
1. An increase in the share of firms within the proximity of the threshold;
2. A drop in the probability of growth for firms at the threshold.
These predictions, coupled with the smoothness of the relation between firm size and
the probability of inaction implied by (4), oﬀer an identification strategy to estimate the
impact of EPL on the growth choices of firms below the threshold: if we observe that the
probability of growth follows a smooth pattern, interrupted in the proximity of the threshold,
than we can speculate that the deviation from this smooth relation is attributable to the
13For example, fixing α to 2/3, l˜ to 15, w to α
151−α (so that A at l = 15 is 1) and λ to 1.05, we find
that A¯ =1.1141, and the corresponding value for l is 20.75. At l¯ = 21, the minimum value of A that makes
adjustment optimal would rise to 1.1145, an increase of less that .04%.
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eﬀects of the EPL. Moreover, given that the diﬀerence between A¯ and A˜+1 increases with
λ, the size of this deviation is an indirect measure of the costs of EPL itself.
This model has several additional predictions that can be empirically tested. First,
by following a similar argument, it can be shown that, with respect to a situation with
no threshold, firms that have employment level l˜ − j, , 1 ≤ j < l˜ should show a lower
probability of increasing employment by j or more, because this would imply their passing
the threshold. Second, define l¯ =int(αA¯λw )
1
1−α , i.e., as the minimum value of l chosen by a
firm that passes the threshold. Then, by using the implicit function theorem, one can show
that ∂ l¯∂λ > 0. This in turn implies that, if the cost of passing the threshold is suﬃciently
large, the range of employment values [l˜ + 1, l¯ − 1] would not be chosen by an expanding
firm.14
The simple way EPL is modeled is more problematic when considering the behavior of
firms above the threshold. Here, employment adjustment will be influenced by EPL itself,
arguably reducing the propensity to hire and fire with respect to an unregulated world
(Bentolila & Bertola 1990). Indeed, our within country analysis would hardly identify the
overall eﬀects of EPL; in our simulations we will therefore keep the behavior of firms above
the threshold fixed. This implies that we can only identify the size eﬀect deriving from the
reduction in the propensity to grow of firms below the threshold. While this is clearly an
important limitation, theoretical models of EPL do not identify any clear cut eﬀect of EPL
per se on average firm size, because it should reduce both hirings and firings, with second
order eﬀects on average employment.15 It is therefore arguable that our analysis captures
the most important channel through which EPL influences firm size, a conjecture that will
14Numerical analysis shows that l¯ is very sensitive to λ: fixing as before α to 2/3 and l˜ to 15 and w to
α
151−α (so that A at l = 15 is 1), at λ = 1.01 the jump point is 19, and at λ = 1.1 it is 29.15See Schivardi (2000) for a simple model that formalizes this notion and for a survey of the available
evidence.
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require further work to be verified.
4 Estimating the threshold eﬀect
We use data on firms collected in the period 1986-1998 by the Italian Social Security Ad-
ministration (Inps),16 which covers the entire population of private firms with at least one
employee (about 1.1 million firms per year). We use information collected in January of
each year so that the size of each firm is defined as the stock of employees registered in the
Inps’ archive in this month.17 Figure 1 reports the share of firms and of employment by
size class for the whole economy in the entire sample period 1986-98. The main features of
the pictures are by now well known:18
• Small firms constitute the vast majority of the population: more than 75% of them
have less than 5 employees, and only 0.3% more than 250.
• The picture is dramatically diﬀerent in terms of employment: firms with less than 5
employees account for around 15% of employment, those with at least 250 employees
for 35%.
The density function declines smoothly with size. To get a closer picture of the distri-
bution in the neighborhood of the threshold, Figure 2 reports the annual average number
of firms by firm size in the 8-25 employment interval. Similar to Istat (2002), which uses
16A comprehensive description of Inps’ archives can be found in Contini (2002).
17The employment concept of the “Statuto dei lavoratori” relevant to determine the 15-employee threshold
excludes workers with an apprenticeship contract; moreover, case-law allows firms to weight part time workers
according to the hours actually worked and refers to the usual employment level. While this will introduce
some noise in our estimates it does not seem to be very relevant. In fact, Borgarello et al. (2002), using a richer
data set for the province of Turin, that accounts for such factors, do not find major diﬀerences comparing
the inaction probability of firms around the threshold computed according to two diﬀerent concepts of
employment, the first identical to the one we use, the other more similar to the one to which the law refers.
18The analysis is conducted on the whole private sector. Manufacturing and services repeat the same
patterns, with the distribution shifted to the right for the first and to the left for the second, arguably
because of technological factors.
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data on 1999 from the Statistical Archive on Active Firms, the number of firms regularly
declines until 12-13 employees; it still declines, but at a slower pace, at 14 and 15, and drops
at 16, after which the number of firms starts to decrease again at a regular pace. This weak
disturbance in the relation between the number of firms and their size is a sign that some
threshold eﬀect is probably at work, even if its impact on the size distribution appears to
be limited.
We turn to the predictions of the model in terms of growth probability. For each
employment level we compute this probability as the share of firms that increase the number
of employees from one year to the next. Figure 3 plots this probability against size in the 5-
25 employment range; the probability of growth increases regularly with size, as predicted
by the model. Moreover, a clear downward spike emerges at 14-15 employees, just at
the EPL threshold. Similar patterns are observed when separately analyzing services and
manufacturing, the main diﬀerence being that small firms in the service sector have a lower
probability of growth (Figure 4).19
Consistent with the model, the inertia probability shows an upward spike at 15 (Figure
5). The probability of reducing the number of employees is somewhat more irregular than
the inertia and the growth probability (Figure 6), so that it is diﬃcult to single out any
clear threshold eﬀect.
19We have also checked that this probability is stable over time. The share of firms that increase em-
ployment from one year to the next for four size classes around the 15 threshold (5-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25)
shows a clear cyclical pattern and a slightly negative trend. This, however, seems to mirror the diﬀerences
in macroeconomic conditions between the first and second half of the period rather than a structural change
in the firm size dynamics. Moreover, the four groups of firms share the same tendencies, so that it seems
fair to say that the probability of growing net of cyclical factors has remained quite stable in the size range
we consider.
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To quantify this eﬀect, we estimate a probit model at the firm-year level of the form:
yit = α+
4X
j=1
βjl
j
it−1 +
nX
k=1
γkD(16− k)it−1 +Xit + ²it (9)
where yit = 1 if lit > lit−1 and 0 otherwise. This binary variable is regressed on a fourth
degree polynomial in size, and a set of dummies D(16− k)it−1 that are equal to 1 if lit−1 =
16− k, k = 1, 2, ...; Xit are additional controls. In particular, we always include the age of
the firm (quadratic form), 2 digit sector, year and 20 regional dummies. The estimates of
γk should capture the threshold eﬀect due to EPL, given that the fourth degree polynomial
in size should account for the smooth relation between size and the probability of growing.
All our results are robust to alternative specification.20
Table 2 reports the results of the estimates and Figure 7 plots the actual probability
of growth and the predicted values by size. As the figure shows, the model fits the actual
probabilities quite well, and the dummy at size 15 is approximately -1.5 percentage points
and significant, while at 14 it drops to -.35 percentage points, and it is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero at 13. Borgarello et al. (2002) obtain remarkably similar results from a
relatively small sample using annual averages instead of microdata, without controlling for
age, industry and location of firms.
We run several robustness checks. We have repeated this exercise for the service and
manufacturing sectors in order to assess whether the apparently diﬀerent relation between
probability and size we saw above has any significant impact on the estimate of the threshold
eﬀect.21 Table 2, column 2, reports the estimates and Figure 8 plots actual and predicted
20Our results do not change substantially if we include dummies for firms whose size is just above the
threshold or extend the sample to firms with less than 5 or more than 25 employees, or restrict ourselves to
firms belonging to specific age groups, such as young firms.
21Note that these two sectors are not exhaustive, as construction and mining are not included therein.
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probabilities for manufacturing, while column 3 and Figure 9 do so for services. Once we
split the sample, the threshold eﬀect seems to be slightly higher (-1.78 in manufacturing
and -1.76 in the service sector).22
Given that we consider the probability of growth, irrespective of by how much, the
dummy at 14 is harder to interpret, as a firm with 14 employees could still hire one worker
without passing the threshold. Our estimates of the threshold eﬀect could therefore be
downward biased for this size class. More generally, as argued in the model of the previous
section, we should expect that the threshold eﬀect reduces the probability of passing it
for any employment level below it. To visualize this eﬀect, Figure 10 reports in each sub-
panel the probability of growing by 1 or more, 2 or more and so on. The eﬀect is very
apparent for employment levels not far from the threshold, while it tends to disappear as
we move further away from it. This is due to the fact that the probability of experiencing
a shock that prompts a suﬃciently large size increase to cross the threshold diminishes as
we move away from the threshold itself: in fact, the smooth expansion pattern implied by
Gibrat’s law makes large increases less likely. The same pattern is observed looking at the
probability of growing by exactly 1, 2, 3, etc., as reported in Figure 11. In this case, the
drop is more clearly apparent, in line with the theoretical prediction that firms that pass the
threshold should record relatively larger employment increases, so that moving just above
the threshold is a less likely event.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the dummy 15 for the probability of growing by one
or more, of the dummy 14 for the probability of growing by two or more, of the dummy
13 for that of growing by 3 or more and so forth, obtained by probit models separately
estimated for each size increase. We used a fourth-degree polynomial in size for rows 1
22We have also produced annual estimates of the threshold eﬀect, without observing any clear trend in
their magnitude.
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and 2, a third-degree polynomial for row 3 and a second-degree polynomial in size in the
other probits to accommodate the fact that the relation becomes progressively more linear,
as is apparent in Fig. 10. As can be seen, the impact of the threshold moving away from
15 rapidly becomes very low: we estimate that for a firm with 12 workers the threshold
prompts a reduction in the probability of growing by 4 or more of 0.36 percentage points;
for a firm with 10 workers the reduction in the probability of growing by 6 or more is to
0.1 points and for firms with 8 workers the drop in the probability of growth by 8 or more
is only 0.06 percentage points. The eﬀects are negligible afterward.
We have tested other predictions of our model. As suggested by the model, conditional
on increasing employment, we observe a higher than expected size of the upward adjustment
for firms at the threshold; however the magnitude of this eﬀect is very small and not precisely
estimated. As to the probability of a size decrease, the pattern is much noisier than that
observed for the probability of an increase, and we could not pin down any sizable threshold
eﬀect.
4.1 Extensions
It has been argued (Ichino, Polo & Rettore 2003) that local labor market conditions could
aﬀect courts’ decisions, in that in a tighter labor market, judges would be more inclined to
allow a dismissal than when the unemployment rate is high and the possibility of finding a
new job low. Ichino et al. (2003) seem to find some supporting evidence for this argument
by analyzing the personnel data of a large bank with branches throughout Italy. According
to this hypothesis, the actual application of EPL and the cost of crossing the 15-employee
threshold should diﬀer according to the local labor market conditions. As in the South the
unemployment rate is much higher than in the North (in 1993, the first year of the new
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labor force survey, unemployment was about 17 per cent in the South and 6 per cent in the
North), we should observe a stricter application of EPL and therefore a greater incentive to
remain under the threshold in southern regions. We test this hypothesis by repeating our
exercise and computing the threshold eﬀect by area. In columns 4 to 7 of Table 2 we report
the estimates by area. Our evidence does not support the hypothesis. Contrary to what
one would expect, the eﬀect seems to be weaker in the South than elsewhere (0.9 percentage
points, against 2.4 in the Center, 2.0 in the North west and 1.5 in the North east).23.
Saint-Paul (2002) claims that EPL should be more relevant for firms in innovative
sectors, as they would face a rapidly changing environment and therefore would require a
higher workers’ turnover rate. To test this assumption, we have repeated our basic exercise
for two broad manufacturing sectors that should diﬀer as to the incidence of innovative
activities: the traditional products sector (textile, leather and wood) and the machinery
and equipment sector. The estimate of the threshold eﬀect is somewhat larger for the
machinery sector, as predicted by the theory (1.6 vis-a-vis 1.2), but the diﬀerence between
the two sectors is not statistically significant.
Labor laws introduce multiple thresholds relevant to diﬀerent aspects of the employ-
ment relation (Baﬃ & Baﬃ 1999). To check for the presence of other significant thresholds,
Figure 12 reports the inaction probability24 by firm size in the range from 5 to 55 work-
ers; in addition to the one at 15, another clear hump appears at 35. In fact, firms with
more than 35 employees were requested, until the reform of 1999,25 to hire 15 per cent of
23The hypothesis that a high unemployment rate is associated with a more lenient application of EPL is
not supported by a time series analysis either. In fact, considering litigation from 1975 to 1999 we observe
that the rate of success of workers is lower in the mid-1990s, when the number of judgments was very large
due to the early 90s’ recession that sharply increased the unemployment rate.
24We use the inaction probability because that of growth becomes somehow more erratic for larger values
of employment.
25The reform of March 1999 changed the rule in the following way: firms with 15 to 35 workers have to
hire a worker from the protected categories; firms with 35 to 50 employees have to hire two workers; and
firms with more than 50 employees have to hire 7 per cent of their workforce from these categories. This
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their workers from the list of the so-called “protected categories”, namely disabled people,
refugees, orphans and widows of persons who died in war or in the workplace. This rule
substantially restricted firms’ freedom to choose their employees. To quantify its eﬀects, we
run the same specification as before, with two dummies for firms with 34 and 35 employees.
Even if the relation between the probability of growth and size is not as smooth as in the
range from 5 to 25 employees, the relation is stable enough to single out a drop in the prob-
ability just around the threshold (Table 4): the probability of growth is reduced between 1
and 2 percentage points, again in this case a significant but rather limited amount.
All in all, these results indicate that the eﬀects of EPL on firm growth are in line with
the theoretical predictions, but that their extent appear to be rather limited.
5 EPL and firm size in steady state
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the impact eﬀect of the threshold might
be modest. However, we lack a precise metric to determine its long-run eﬀect: in fact,
it could be that an apparently small eﬀect on the year-to-year probability of growing is
compounded in the long run and has a sizable impact on the steady-state distribution. To
assess the long-run consequences of EPL on the size distribution, we use a representation
of firms’ dynamics based on a stochastic transition matrix (STM). An STM is a matrix
P whose entries pi,j represent the probability of a firm moving from size class j to size
class i from one year to the next, for any size class subdivision. Given that our dataset
comprises the firms’ population, we can calculate the exact probabilities of transition for
any size class subdivision. This can be seen as a non-parametric representation of the
has made the 35-employee threshold less relevant, by decreasing the share of ”protected” workers and by
spreading it more evenly across firms of diﬀerent sizes. The recent changes in the rules do not aﬀect our
sample, as it includes data from 1986 to 1998.
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transition probability of firm size that exploits the Markov property of the productivity
shocks assumed in (3).
Define Xt as the n-dimensional vector {xt1, ..., xtn+1}, where xti is the share of firms in
size class i and n+ 1 represents exit.26 Then, the evolution of X is governed by the system
of diﬀerence equations:
Xt+1 = PXt (10)
The theory of Markov chains establishes that, under regularity conditions,27 each STM is
associated with a unique steady-state distribution, irrespective of any initial distribution
X0; the long-run distribution is obtained by solving the system of equations X = PX, in
addition to the condition Σjxj = 1. Our strategy is to calculate the steady state distribu-
tion associated with the actual STM and to modify the STM by removing the threshold
eﬀects according to the findings of the previous section. The corresponding steady state
distribution can then be interpreted as the one that would emerge in the absence of the
threshold eﬀect, thus obtaining a well-defined measure of the long-run impact of EPL on
firm size.
Table 5 reports the STM, constructed as an average of the yearly matrices for the period
1986-98. We take the average over the period to minimize the possibility that business cycle
factors influence the long-run analysis. A preliminary inspection of the matrix revels that
the assumptions of the model are in line with the data. The persistence of the size at the
26To accommodate entry and exit we use the following convention: the last row of the matrix represents
exit and the last column entry; xtn+1 is the share of entrants between the beginning and the end of period
t, so that pn+1,ixtn+1 is the contribution of entry to x
t+1
i ; x
t+1
n+1 =
P
j pn+1,jx
t
j is the share of exit between t
and t+1. This implies that xtn+1 represents exits during the previous period at the beginning of the period
and entry during the current period at the end of it. This convention agrees perfectly with the steady state,
where entry and exit are necessarily the same.
27A STM P is said to be regular if, when raised to some power k, it has the property that all its elements
are strictly positive. In this case, there exists a unique long-run limiting distribution (Karlin & Taylor 1975)
22
individual level clearly emerges from the diagonal, whose entries are always the largest in
the column.28 Moreover, the matrix confirms that firm size tends to evolve smoothly: in
fact, entries in the cells adjacent to the diagonal are always larger than those farther away
from it, indicating that big jumps are less likely than small ones. Entry occurs mostly at
the small end of the size distribution, and the probability of death decreases with firm size.
One potential problem with this approach is that the actual size distribution might
be very diﬀerent from the steady state one. In this case, projecting ahead the evolution
of the size distribution might be a dangerous exercise, because any temporary trend might
be inflated in steady-state. Table 6 reports the actual distribution (calculated as the aver-
age over the period 1986-98) and the steady-state distribution. The table shows that the
movements in the size distribution seem to imply a slightly larger share of firms in the in-
termediate classes, with a very small decrease of the share of those in the largest class. The
last column reports the actual average size within class µj;
29 using this, we can compute
the implied average steady state size as µss =
P
j x
ss
j µj. It turns out that the increase in
the share of firms in the intermediate size classes more than compensate for the decrease in
the largest: in fact, the steady state mean size is 9.24, compared with 9.0 for the actual size.
The increase is small, indicating that for the period 1986-98 there seems to be no disruptive
trend in firm size distribution.
Having checked the reliability of the steady-state analysis, we now proceed to compute
the long-run eﬀect of the threshold. Our first experiment restricts the threshold eﬀect to
influencing only the growth probability of firms in the proximity of the threshold itself.
28The persistence probability depends on the range of employment that each cell covers, with persistence
increasing with the size of the range. This explains for example why the diagonal entry for the 16-20 class
is larger than that for the 13-15 class. As we show below, our results are very robust to changes in the
size-class subdivision.
29 It is reasonable to assume that the average size within class µi is fixed. This is an obvious identity for
size classes defined only on one employment level. It is also a reasonable assumption in this context, where
we look at changes in the distribution between classes and not within them.
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Our probit estimates show that the threshold eﬀect reduces the probability of growth by
approximately 2 percentage points for firms in the 9th size class, which corresponds to the
13-15 employment interval. We therefore reduce the persistence probability for that class by
reducing the entry in the diagonal; correspondingly, we increase the probability of growing
using two diﬀerent assumptions about the way firms would grow in the absence of the
threshold: first, we redistribute the probability to the size class just above the threshold;
second, we redistribute it to all size classes above the threshold, in proportion to the actual
probability of moving to each class (excluding the exit class).30 Formally, if the reduction
in the persistence probability is δ, then we modify the entries in the matrix as follows:
p˜9,9 = p9,9 − δ (11)
p˜10,9 = p10,9 + δ (12)
p˜i,9 = pi,9 + δ
pi,9Pn
l=10 pl,9
, i = 10, .., n (13)
where a tilde indicates values that would prevail in the absence of EPL and (12) and
(13) formalize the two redistribution assumptions. We then compute a new steady state
distribution X˜ and, using the within-class average size, the average size that would prevail
in the absence of the EPL: µ˜ =
Pn
ι=1 x˜iµi. We also compute the change in the share of
firms above 15 employees.
Table 7 reports the results of these experiments. The first column reports the size
classes modified in the experiment; the second the size of the probability redistribution; the
30The first redistribution assumption is more in line with the model, as it assumes that firms that do not
grow are those that have received shocks not large enough to make it worthwhile to cross the threshold. The
second can be seen as an upper bound of the eﬀect of removing the threshold.
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last four columns report the change in average size and in the share of firms above 15 for the
two redistribution methods. The first line reports the results of the basic experiments, in
which only the 13-15 size class is modified. We find that an increase of two percentage points
in the growth probability of firms in this size class (an overestimate, given that we are also
attributing the larger decrease of firms with 15 employees to firms with 14 and 13 employees)
would bring about an increase of 0.5% in the average firm size (from 9.24 to 9.28) using the
first redistribution assumption (equation 12) and of 0.7% using the second (equation 13).
Moreover, the share of firms above the 15 threshold increases by small amounts, always well
below 1 percentage point. These are clearly small eﬀects, in particular in the light of the
“Italian anomaly”, i.e. that firm size in Italy is approximately half that of the average for
the European Union (Pagano & Schivardi 2003).
A first possible explanation of such low eﬀects is that we have only considered the
size class just below the threshold, while in the previous section we have seen that in the
other classes there is also a clear decline in the probability of growing above the threshold.
We therefore modify the probability for the previous size classes according to the estimate
reported in Table 3. The next two lines report the results when we modify, in addition to
the 9th, the entries in columns 8 (by .36 percentage points) and 7 (by .1 percentage points),
corresponding to the 10-12 and 8-9 size classes. In line with the theoretical analysis, our
assumption is that firms that are discouraged from passing the threshold stop right before
it. Correspondingly, we subtract probability from the 9th row, corresponding to the 13-15
size class, and redistribute it to the cells of larger size classes. We find that the eﬀects are
only marginally greater, increasing average firm size by 0.65 and 1.2 per cent for the two
redistribution methods respectively.
We have seen that estimating the reduction in the probability of growth for the size
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classes further away from the threshold is rather problematic. As an alternative approach
to determining such probabilities we assume that, for j = 1, 2, ..., 8, the increase in the
probability of moving to the size class just below the threshold, p9,j , and the symmetric
reduction in that of passing the threshold itself, is proportional to that estimated for the
size class 9, where this reduction was around 2 percentage points against a persistence
probability of 34%, so that the increase in persistence is in the order of 1/17. Formally,
δj =
1
17p9,j, j = 1, 2, ...8 (14)
so that
p˜9,j = p9,j − δj (15)
p˜10,j = p10,j + δj (16)
p˜i,j = pi,j + δj
pi,jPn
l=10 pl,j
, i = 10, .., n (17)
Results are reported in lines 4-9 of Table 7. The second column reports the size of the
probability reallocation calculated according to equation (14). The probability reallocation
is slightly higher than estimated, and so is the increase in the average size. However, as
we add in more classes away from the threshold the additional eﬀect becomes increasingly
smaller, because the probability of moving just below the threshold becomes smaller and
smaller. In practice, most of the change is accounted for by the classes with 8 employees
and above. When all classes are included, the average firm size increase is 0.86% in the first
reallocation method and 1.8 in the second. This analysis therefore suggests that most of
the eﬀect of the threshold takes place in its proximity, while that stemming from smaller
firms is likely to be very small.
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We have performed several robustness checks. We have experimented with diﬀerent
values of δ, the threshold eﬀects. We found that the increase in average size grows less than
proportionally with it: for example, a δ = 4 percentage points in the baseline experiment
brings about an increase in average size of 0.9%, against the 0.5 of the basic experiment with
δ = 2. This implies that, even if we had substantially underestimated the threshold eﬀect,
the size increase is bound to remain modest. We have also controlled that the particular
size class subdivision chosen does not influence results. We have repeated the experiment
for a finer class subdivision, designed so that each size class contains approximately 3% of
total employment (the approximate share of size classes defined over one employee) and
composed of 32 classes, obtaining slightly smaller eﬀects.
We have seen that another empirically relevant threshold occurs at 35. We perform the
experiment of removing that threshold, again using the two redistributive assumptions above
and, from the estimates in the previous section, taking 2 percentage points as the reduction
in the growth probability induced by the threshold. Again, we find that the increase in
the long-run average firm size is below 1%, a further indication that the threshold eﬀects
induced by EPL explain very little of the Italian left-skewed distribution of firm size.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the role on EPL in determining firm size distribution. We have
exploited the fact that EPL applies diﬀerentially to firms of diﬀerent size, which has some
clear-cut implications for firm dynamics. Our empirical analysis was based on Italy, where
there is both a clear-cut increase in the stringency of EPL regulation for firms above the
15-employee threshold and a large population of small firms, making it an ideal candidate
to find such eﬀects. Our results show that EPL does influence firm dynamics, but that
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its eﬀects are quantitatively modest: in most of our experiments, average firm size would
increase by less than 1% in steady state when removing the eﬀect of EPL. We take this
finding as indicating that the sources of cross-country diﬀerences in firms size distribution
are not likely to be explained substantially by diﬀerences in labor market regulation.
Our results also have implications for the overall relevance of EPL. While we do not
directly measure the costs of EPL, the threshold eﬀect is clearly a function of the perceived
costs of passing it. Given that we find that the discouragement eﬀect is modest, one can infer
that the overall additional costs of the stricter legislation are not very large, an important
input in the debate on the role of labor market regulation for economic performance.
This observation leads to our final point. Our model has the advantage of capturing
threshold eﬀects in a simple setting. For further policy evaluation, however, it would be
important to set up a model that explicitly incorporates firing restrictions. While greatly
increasing the complexity of the analysis, particularly on the empirical side, this would allow
to directly recover a measure of firing costs, a policy relevant issue. We plan to pursue this
task in future work.
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Table 1: Average number of employees per firm in broad sectors of OECD countries, 1989-94
Total Non-agric. Manufacturing Business
economy business sector services
United States 26.4 25.6 80.3 21.4
western Germany 17.0 17.7 39.1 11.5
France 33.5 33.2 32.1 35.7
Italy 10.5 10.0 15.3 6.8
United Kingdom 40.7
Canada 12.7 15.2 40.5 12.0
Denmark 13.3 15.2 30.4 12.7
Finland 13.0 13.0 27.8 9.9
Netherlands 6.5 5.8 18.3 5.3
Portugal 16.8 17.4 31.0 11.4
Source: Bartelsman et al. (2003).
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Table 2: Probit model. Probability of growth, by sector and area
Total Man. Serv. N-W N-E C S
Size 4.89∗∗∗
(0.34)
4.12∗∗∗
(0.54)
6.20∗∗∗
(0.53)
4.93∗∗∗
(0.90)
1.58
(1.03)
4.70∗∗∗
(1.21)
6.28∗∗∗
(1.33)
Size^2 −0.37∗∗∗
(0.04)
−0.26∗∗∗
(0.07)
−0.52∗∗∗
(0.06)
−0.36∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.09
(0.12)
−0.35∗∗∗
(0.15)
−0.58∗∗∗
(0.17)
Size^3 0.01∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.00)
∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗
(0.01)
−0.013∗∗
(0.01)
0.01
(0.1)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
Size^4 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
−0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
−0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00∗∗
(0.00)
Age −0.78∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.97∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.74∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.92∗∗∗
(0.03)
−1.05∗∗∗
(0.03)
−0.86∗∗∗
(0.03)
−0.96∗∗∗
(0.03)
Age^2 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
Du13 0.07
(0.14)
0.06
(0.22)
0.11
(0.24)
0.14
(0.38)
−0.44
(0.41)
0.57
(0.49)
−0.07
(0.56)
Du14 −0.35∗∗
(0.15)
0.22
(.23)
−0.96∗∗∗
(0.25)
−0.45
(0.38)
0.35
(0.43)
−0.04
(0.53)
0.39
(0.60)
Du15 −1.51∗∗∗
(0.16)
−1.78∗∗∗
(0.24)
−1.76∗∗∗
(0.27)
−1.98∗∗∗
(0.39)
−1.51∗∗∗
(0.44)
−2.42∗∗∗
(0.53)
−0.91
(0.63)
Pseudo Rsq 1.64 1.89 1.54 2.08 1.9 1.54 1.64
N. obs 3, 263, 287 1, 397, 795 1, 362, 775 508, 064 397, 976 276, 271 215, 484
Note: Probit estimates. The table reports the change in probability for an infinitesimal change
in each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy
variables. Sector, year and regional dummies included in the model.
Firms in the range 5 - 25 workers. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗10%. Standard
errors in brackets.
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Table 3: Size dummy estimates
Probability of increasing by: Size dummy Parameter
dy/dx
1 or more 15 −1.51∗∗∗
(0.16)
2 or more 14 −0.79∗∗∗
(0.13)
3 or more 13 −0.39∗∗∗
(0.09)
4 or more 12 −0.36∗∗∗
(0.06)
5 or more 11 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.05)
6 or more 10 −0.11∗∗∗
(0.04)
7 or more 9 −0.10∗∗∗
(0.02)
8 or more 4 −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02)
Note: Each row refers to a diﬀerent probit model. The first reports the estimate of the dummy
at 15 for the probability of growing by one or more, the second the estimate of dummy 14 for the
probability of growing by 2 or more etc. The table reports the discrete change in probability due to
these dummies. Age of the firm (quadratic form) and sector, year and regional dummies included in
the models. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ 10%. Standard errors in brackets. We
used a fourth-degree polynomial in size for rows 1 and 2, a third-degree polynomial for row 3 and
a second-degree polynomial in size in the other probits, to accommodate the diﬀerent relationships
between these probabilities and size, which is apparent in Fig. 10 .
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Table 4: Probit model. Probability of growth
Variables Parameter
dy/dx
Size 2.51∗∗∗
(0.43)
Size^2 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01)
Size^3 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Age 0.44∗∗∗
(0.02)
Age^2 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Du34 −0.96∗∗
(0.39)
Du35 −1.86∗∗∗
(0.41)
Note: The table reports the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent,
continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. Year, sector
and regional dummies included in the model. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ 10%.
Standard errors in brackets. Firms in the range 20-50 workers. Number of observations: 539,191;
Pseudo Rsq=1.71
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Table 6: Firm size distribution (actual and steady state) and average size within each class
Size class Actual sh. Ss sh. Diﬀerence µj
1 41.00 39.62 1.38 0.85
2 15.90 15.61 0.29 2.00
3 9.46 9.37 0.09 3.00
4 6.17 6.18 -0.01 4.00
5 4.34 4.40 -0.06 5.00
7 5.77 5.92 -0.15 6.44
9 3.72 3.85 -0.13 8.45
12 3.64 3.83 -0.18 10.89
15 2.39 2.56 -0.18 13.91
20 2.19 2.43 -0.24 17.74
24 1.02 1.16 -0.14 22.37
29 0.86 0.99 -0.13 26.86
35 0.76 0.88 -0.12 32.34
49 0.87 1.03 -0.16 41.59
99 1.06 1.25 -0.19 68.51
249 0.54 0.61 -0.08 150.60
499 0.16 0.17 -0.00 346.49
500+ 0.14 0.13 0.01 1800.77
The first column is the size class, the second the share calculated from the data, the third the
implied steady-state share, the fourth the diﬀerence between the two, and the last the average firm
size within class.
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Table 7: Percentage increase in average firm size and in the share of firms above the 15-
employee threshold in steady state
Experiment Outcome by reallocation method
Next Proportional
Classes δ Mean % >15 Mean %. >15
Baseline case: size class 13-15
13+ 2 .5 .16 .7 .18
Other classes: experiment A (actual estimates)
10+ .36 .62 .21 1.1 .24
8+ .10 .65 .22 1.2 .26
Other classes: experiment B (proportional changes)
10+ .72 .75 .25 1.3 .3
8+ .14 .80 .27 1.5 .32
6+ .05 .82 .28 1.6 .34
5+ .02 .83 .28 1.6 .34
4+ .01 .84 .28 1.7 .35
1+ .003 .86 .29 1.8 .36
Note: Jump is the decrease in the probability of inaction; Next cell means that the reduction in
inaction is compensated by an identical increase in the probability of moving to the next size class,
Proportional by an increase in all superior size classes, in proportion to the actual probability of
moving to each of them; the outcome columns report the percentage increase in steady-state average
size and the percentage points increase in share of firms above 15 and 35 employees.
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Figure 1: Firm and employment shares by size class (Average values over the 1986-98
period)
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Figure 2: Number of firms by size class, average 1986-1998 (thousands)
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Figure 3: Probability of growth by size class, average 1986-1997
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Figure 4: Probability of growth by size class in the service and manufacturing sectors
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Figure 5: Inertia probability by size class, average 1986-1997
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Figure 6: Probability of reducing firm sise by size class, average 1986-1997
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Figure 7: Probability of growth and predicted probabilities, all sectors
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Figure 8: Probability of growth and predicted probability, manufacturing
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Figure 9: Probability of growth and predicted probability, services
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Figure 10: Probability of growing by size of the increase (1 or more, 2 or more, etc.) and
firm size
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Figure 11: Probability of growing by size of the increase and firm size
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Figure 12: Inertia probability by firm size class
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A Appendix: The diﬃculty of assessing employment pro-
tection tightness through international comparisons: the
OECD index
International comparisons can help us understand how restrictive EPL is in any single
country. Unfortunately, international comparisons of institutional arrangements are not
easy and the existing attempts do not seem to be fully satisfactory.
The most influential comparative study is that conducted by the OECD, which col-
lected detailed information on individual and collective dismissals for most member countries
(OECD 1999). The OECD study tried to evaluate how restrictive is the definition of fair
dismissal and how cumbersome are the procedures to fire workers. Moreover, the OECD
assessed the cost of firing a worker, both in the case of a no-fault dismissal and in the case of
an unfair one. This body of information was then summarized in a numerical index, rank-
ing the OECD countries according to the tightness of their legislation. The OECD study
explicitly skipped the diﬃculty of assessing the actual application of the rules by courts,
limiting the analysis to the comparison of legislations. Moreover, to make comparisons
feasible, some base-line assumptions, for instance on the duration of trials, were made.
The OECD index has been criticized on the grounds that apparently similar rules can
have very diﬀerent interpretations across countries and that the same rules can have dif-
ferent eﬀects according to the eﬃciency of the judiciary system, so that this indicator is of
little use for the policy-maker (Bertola, Boeri & Cases 2000). Moreover, even disregard-
ing these criticisms the OECD index computed for Italy appears to be aﬀected by some
misunderstandings of Italian legislation.
The OECD index is a weighted average of scores assigned to diﬀerent aspects of national
employment regulation. As to the indicator of the strictness of employment protection
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for regular employment, the OECD analysts took into account the following issues: the
procedures; the delay to start of notice; the notice period for workers with 9 months, 4
years and 20 years of tenure; and the severance payment for no-fault individual dismissal for
the same tenures; the definition of unfair dismissal; the trial period before eligibility for full
protection; unfair dismissal compensation at 20 years of tenure; the extent of reinstatement.
The index computed for Italy erroneously considered as a firing cost a special kind of
severance payment, the TFR (Trattamento di fine rapporto), which can be regarded as a
sort of deferred salary: this is a one-time payment of the sum put aside during the worker’s
tenure in the firm (0.07 of his yearly income for each year of work), which is at the firm’s
disposal while the worker maintains her job. Italian workers are entitled to this payment
irrespective of the reasons for separation, even in the case of retirement or resignation. In
companies with a private pension fund, the TFR contributes to its funding. Thus, it is a
part of workers’ compensation and is not related to firing. Removing the TFR from firing
costs changes Italy’s ranking dramatically, from fifth to eighteenth position, close to that
of Anglo-Saxon countries.
Moving to the regulation of collective dismissals, we find the interpretation that OECD
analysts gave to Italian rules questionable. Given that collective dismissals impose more
burdensome procedures, they valued the employment regulation of a country to be more
restrictive, the lower the number of dismissals above which a firm is required to apply
this procedure. In the Italian case, as we stated above, this is set at 5 workers, which
is quite low compared to most OECD countries. Therefore, taking the OECD score at
face value, Italian regulation would become less restrictive by raising this threshold to a
higher level. This conclusion, however, is probably incorrect considering together the rules
and their enforcement. On the basis of our earlier remarks, it is plausible that collective
45
dismissal procedures reduce the uncertainty about the result of a dismissal, so that it could
be advantageous for Italian firms to make use of collective dismissals despite additional
burdens. In that case, all things being equal, it would be better to maintain a low threshold.
These considerations are just an example of the kind of diﬃculty we face when we do not take
account of both the rules and their actual application; moreover, they shed further doubt
on the possibility of using the OECD index to orient policy making (Bertola et al. 2000).
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